by Richard Martin
What we know: Prigozhin made a play for power and failed. Everything else in the public domain is pure speculation, most of it fuelled by rumours and intentional disinformation.
Regarding the offensive. The Ukrainians appear to have the initiative, therefore they are on the offensive. How that plays out tactically and operationally is another matter. The Russians have been trying different things, e.g., blowing the dam, but so far only to hinder and slow down movement. The Russian obstacles are, by all accounts, formidable. It is a truism that obstacle breaching by forces under fire is the most complicated operation of all.
However, obstacles that aren’t covered by fire, direct and indirect, are merely a nuisance and will slow movement and manoeuvre, but only up to a point. It’s also important to point out that all fortifications are eventually defeated, either through destruction, breaching, or bypassing (therefore making them irrelevant).
I believe the Ukrainians are being very prudent in their tactical approach. They are unwilling to throw troops into battle without careful preparation and reconnaissance, and will substitute firepower and attrition as much as possible. They appear to be using small units to probe Russian positions and to draw out artillery fire so they can attack it with counter-battery fires. Over the last month or so, it seems that the number of Russian artillery systems destroyed has gone up significantly. The Ukrainians also seem to be focusing on destroying dual-capable systems, i.e., those that can fire nuclear as well as conventional munitions. The Russians call artillery the “god of war” for a reason. The Ukrainians appear to be wearing it down as much as possible.
The Ukrainians are also seeking to wear down Russian forces in depth, and command and control points. They are also attriting Russian logistics and supply capabilities, especially rail hubs, bridges, and other lines of communications, as well as ammunition dumps and troop concentrations.
I am more and more of the opinion that the Ukrainian strategy is to cause as much attrition as possible until such time as the Russians collapse somewhere. Then they can pour forces into the breach and seek to envelope enemy groupings and try to cut them off from retreat. A main objective must be to destroy as much Russian combat capability and kill or wound as many Russian soldiers as possible. This serves the tactical purpose of creating breakthrough opportunities. But, it also serves a longer term purpose of preventing the Russians from starting again if they are completely expelled from Ukraine. This is what they did to reconquer the Kharkiv and Kherson areas, and I see no reason for them to change their overall approach now.
Operationally, informed opinion converges around the idea that the Ukrainians would seek to cut the Russian forces in half by heading to Berdyansk and environs. This would isolate the Crimea from the rest of Russian occupied territory and make the situation there even more precarious.
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